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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







    Petitioner, 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                      Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A079-117-515) 
Immigration Judge: Frederic G. Leeds 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 14, 2011 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
  







  Shasrie Singh (“Singh”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 




  Singh, a native and citizen of Guyana, is removable under Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien who 
entered without being admitted or paroled.  The Immigration Judge granted his 
application for voluntary departure, and set his departure date for March 14, 2002.  In the 
alternative, the IJ ordered his removal to Guyana.  The parties waived an appeal to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals.  Singh failed to depart the United States, and, on April 2, 
2009, he filed a motion to reopen proceedings in Immigration Court in order to seek 
cancellation of removal.  He conceded that his motion was filed beyond the filing 90-day 
deadline, but he argued that the deadline should be tolled because he had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel during his 2001 removal proceedings.  
  On April 21, 2009, the IJ denied the motion to reopen.  After reviewing the 
record of proceedings, including the audiotape of the November 14, 2001 hearing, the IJ 
determined that the motion was untimely because Singh filed it more than seven years 
late, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).  The IJ further determined that, with respect to his 
claim for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, Singh failed to comply with the 
evidentiary requirements of Matter of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (A.G. January 7, 
2009) (“Compean I”), and failed to establish deficient performance by his counsel.  In 
addition, Singh had not made out a prima facie case for cancellation of removal. 
  Singh appealed to the Board and submitted additional exhibits with his 
appeal.  During the pendency of the appeal, the Attorney General reinstated the 
previously established standards for adjudicating motions to reopen based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, see Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).  
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The Board, on January 8, 2010, remanded Singh’s case to the IJ for reconsideration of his 
ineffectiveness claim under the newly-reinstated standards.  On remand, the IJ gave 
Singh an opportunity to submit new arguments and additional evidence in support of his 
untimely motion to reopen.  Singh submitted new documents in support of cancellation of 
removal, and raised new claims for adjustment of status and asylum.  Singh also argued 
that his marriage was bona fide.   
 On April 1, 2010, the IJ again denied Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely 
filed, and again concluded that Singh’s ineffectiveness claim was an insufficient basis to 
toll the filing deadline for a motion to reopen.  The IJ reasoned that Singh did not comply 
with Lozada’s procedural requirements, and he did not show a reasonable likelihood that 
the outcome of his removal proceedings would have been different had prior counsel’s 
representation not been deficient, see Fadiga v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Moreover, Singh was statutorily ineligible to adjust his status because he had 
failed to depart voluntarily after agreeing to do so.  The IJ noted that the consequences 
for failing to depart, including with respect to adjustment of status, were explained to 
Singh at his hearing, and he had indicated that he understood those consequences.  The IJ 
also found that Singh failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that his marriage 
was bona fide, see 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(iii)(B).  With respect to his cancellation of 
removal claim, the IJ found that, even if his motion to reopen was not time-barred, Singh 
failed to make a prima facie showing that he had ten years’ physical presence in the 
United States, or a qualifying relative who would suffer exceptional or extremely unusual 
hardship if he was removed, see Matter of Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001).  
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With respect to his new claim for asylum, the IJ considered whether Singh established 
that reopening was warranted under the statutory exception to the time limit for filing 
motions to reopen to apply for asylum, but determined that the new evidence Singh 
submitted with his motion to reopen did not show changed country conditions in Guyana 
that materially affected his eligibility for asylum. 
  Singh appealed to the Board, and, on August 5, 2010, the Board dismissed 
the appeal.  The Board emphasized that the IJ correctly found that Singh’s motion to 
reopen was untimely, and that he had failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel 
sufficient to toll the filing deadline.  The Board also emphasized that Singh did not 
establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, explaining that he could not 
meet the physical presence requirement or the exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship requirement.  With respect to asylum and withholding of removal, the Board 
reasoned that Singh did not establish a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse 
the untimeliness of his motion to reopen.  Last, the Board agreed with the IJ that Singh 
was barred from adjusting his status, because he had violated his voluntary departure 
order.  Thus, his argument regarding the bona fides of his marriage was irrelevant. 
  Singh timely petitioned for review.  We denied that petition, see Singh v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 430 Fed. Appx. 157 (3d Cir. 2011), holding that Singh’s motion to 
reopen was untimely filed, and that the agency’s determination  that he was not entitled to 
equitable tolling of the deadline because he failed to establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, see Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2005), was not an 
abuse of its discretion.  Singh, 430 Fed. Appx. at 160.  We went on to observe that, 
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because the motion was time-barred, the merits of Singh’s adjustment of status argument 
could not be addressed, but, in any event, Singh was statutorily ineligible to adjust his 
status for a period of 10 years under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B), or until March, 2012.  
Moreover, although his wife’s immediate relative petition had been approved, his 
adjustment of status application had been denied by the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Service (“USCIS”) on February 23, 2011.  Singh, 430 Fed. Appx at 161.  
Last, we held that Singh did not establish what country conditions were in Guyana at the 
time of his November, 2001 hearing, how they had worsened since that time, or how the 
purported change was material to his claim for asylum, and thus the IJ did not abuse his 
discretion in determining that the exception to the filing deadline for changed country 
conditions did not apply.  See id. 
  At issue in the instant petition for review, on November 15, 2010, Singh 
filed a motion to reconsider seeking to submit new evidence of the ineffectiveness of his 
three prior attorneys, Brian Tucker, Stephen Rockmacher, and Andre Sobolevsky.  He 
alleged that the delay in filing the motion to reconsider was caused by his having to 
replace documents that attorney Sobolevsky lost.  He attached to the motion a letter 
Sobolevsky failed to submit previously, which revealed that an individual who helped 
Singh migrate to the United States now wants to kill him because of an outstanding debt.  
This man, whom Singh did not identify, represents a group that the government of 
Guyana cannot or will not control, according to Singh.  Once again, Singh also stressed 
his equities and the hardship that would befall his family should he be deported, and he 
argued that he was eligible to adjust his status. 
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  In a decision dated April 15, 2011, the Board denied the motion.  The 
Board determined that, construed as a motion for reconsideration, it was untimely filed, 
and, construed as a motion to reopen, it was both untimely and number-barred.  The 
Board reasoned that Singh once again did not offer any evidence of compliance with 
Lozada’s notice and bar complaint requirements, nor did he offer an explanation for his 
non-compliance.  Thus, his ineffectiveness claim was an insufficient basis to toll the 
filing deadlines for both motions, or to ease the number restriction for motions to reopen.  
The Board also declined to sua sponte reopen proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because 
Singh’s new marriage and family was not an exceptional or unusual situation warranting 
sua sponte reopening under Matter of J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 1997).  With respect 
to his claim for asylum and withholding of removal, the Board also determined that Singh 
could not benefit from the exception to timeliness for changed country conditions 
because his evidence was insufficient, immaterial, and also did not establish a prima facie 
case for asylum, see Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 258 (BIA 2007).  In the 
margin, the Board noted that the harm Singh feared in Guyana did not appear to be 
motivated by a protected ground and thus would not establish a prima facie case for 
asylum and withholding of removal.  Moreover, he offered no evidence to support a 
claim that he was more likely than not to be tortured with government acquiescence, 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 
  Singh timely petitions for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1), (b)(1) to review the Board’s decision denying the motion to reopen. 
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  We will deny the petition for review.  We review the denial of a motion to 
reopen for an abuse of discretion.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty, 502 
U.S. 314, 323 (1992).  Under this deferential standard, we will reverse the Board’s 
decision only if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 
F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion, whether construed as one for reconsideration or one to reopen, as untimely filed.  
The motion had to have been filed within 30 days of August 5, 2010 to be timely as a 
motion to reconsider, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), or within 90 days of November 14, 
2001 to be timely as a motion to reopen, see id. at § 1003.2(c)(2), and it was not.   
 The Board also did not abuse its discretion in determining that Singh’s 
latest ineffectiveness claim was an insufficient basis to toll the filing deadlines for both 
motions.  His latest claim suffers from the same deficiencies that we noted in his prior 
case, Singh, 430 Fed. Appx. at 160-61.  Again, there is no evidence that he complied with 
the notice and bar complaint requirements of Lozada, and his reasons for not doing so are 
weak, see Singh, 430 Fed. Appx. at 161.  Further, the Board’s decision not to sua sponte 
reopen proceedings is unreviewable.  Cruz v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2006); Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 Singh’s evidence that an individual in Guyana has threatened to do him 
harm is not evidence material to a claim of asylum, and thus does not provide a basis for 
applying the exception to timeliness, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (time and number limits 
do not apply to motions to reopen “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of 
deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the 
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country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not 
available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”).  An 
asylum claimant must show that he is a person who is unable to return to his home 
country because of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1).  Singh has never 
established that he belongs to any protected category.  He claims only that the person 
who helped him migrate to the United States now wishes to harm him over an unpaid 
debt, but an alien who fears personal retribution over an unpaid debt does not qualify for 
asylum.  Cf. Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 741 (3d Cir. 2005) (fear of retribution 
over purely personal matter does not support claim for asylum).  In the alternative, the 
Board did not act arbitrarily in determining that Singh failed to establish prima facie 
eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention 
Against Torture, because Singh offered no evidence that he would be harmed on account 
of a protected ground. 
 Last, to the extent Singh has argued in his Informal Brief that he is eligible 
for adjustment of status and/or cancellation of removal, we note that the claims are barred 
from consideration because his motion to reconsider/reopen was untimely, and the Board 
declined to reopen the untimely motion sua sponte to consider the applications. 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
